The protophenomenal perspective has several benefits. First, it allows the fact of conscious experience to be integrated into scientific theory without denying or distorting the nature of that experience. Second, it permits a form of reduction of the more complex to the simpler while acknowledging the complexity of phenomena and avoiding naive introspectionism. Third, it permits a detailed account of the structure of conscious experience.
Of course, many open questions remain. For example: What are the activity sites and what sorts of physical systems can be activity sites? (This has implications for nonbiological consciousness.) What distinguishes conscious from nonconscious neural activity? Are protophenomena emergent? (This has implications for degrees of consciousness.) Are protophenomena qualitatively exhausted by their mutual dependencies (structuralism)? What can we say about the boundaries and unity of consciousness? Finally, much detailed neurophenomenological work remains to be done before we will understand the detailed structure of consciousness.