SS4.1
From Chapel Hill History of Philosophy
Delight in the good is coupled with interest. ¶1
That is good which by means of reason commends itself by its mere concept. We call that good for something which only pleases as a means; but that which pleases on its own account we call good in itself. In both cases the concept of an end is implied, and consequently the relation of reason to (at least possible) willing, and thus a delight in the existence of an object or action, i.e., some interest or other.
DISCUSSION (Back to ToC)
A Terminological Question in SS4.1
The first paragraph of 4 is remarkably faithful to the scholastic tradition that developed out of Aristotle’s ethics, and, perhaps for that very reason, it sounds odd to us. But for that very same reason it is an excellent demonstration of a point I made earlier about how Kant was part of a movement to translate Latin ideas into German ones. And it does lead to an interesting question for us.
Let me illustrate the point in regard to oddities in the first and forth sentences by reproducing an on-line quote from Fulvio de Blasi writing about Aquinus on the good:
""Good" (bonum) is, for Aquinas, a transcendental concept because it signifies exactly the same reality as "being" (ens). Yet, the term "good" makes conceptually explicit something that in the use of "ens" remains implicit. This is why Aquinas says that "good" adds something to the understanding of "ens" (super intellectum entis): something that is not in the things (in rerum natura) but only in reason (in ratione tantum). Specifically, "good" adds to "ens" a conceptual reference to the fact that the ens' esse is an act, which gives existence and perfection to the ens, and which is therefore what the ens itself tends toward. The concept of good, in other words, contains a conceptual reference to the actual -- existing -- ens being always an end and an object of an appetite: "et inde est quod omnes recte diffinientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid quod pertinet ad habitudinem finis.""
For us the oddity of the first sentence is the role it assigns to reason in the liking for what is good. The oddity of the fourth sentence (or at least part of it) comes from the assertion that the good always contains the concept of a purpose. Both of these ideas are plainly present in either Aquinas’s analysis or, at least, in that of someone who makes a living interpreting Aquinas. If I recall correctly the Romans invented the term “ens� to translate Aristotle’s “to on�, when they were engaged in a similar project to the one that Kant was participating in.
Probably my point is self-evident in the second and third sentences. I think all of us will recognize Aristotle’s propter se—ad aliud distinction, but here is an example from Peter Lombard’s “Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences�
“One is to enjoy that alone, which is to be loved for its own sake; but that alone is to be loved for its own sake, which is good on its own account [propter se]; but that is good on its own account, which has the goodness, which it has, not from an other, nor is that goodness for an other.�
The verb “fruor, “ translated here as “to enjoy,� is interesting because its second meaning in Cassell’s is translated by the legal phrase “to have the use and enjoyment of�.
Since we have agreed to linger on a matter in the third Critique only when we agree that the discussion might be on a path to the truth, I suppose we ought to reflect on whether these venerable concepts, organized more or less as Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, etc. would have them organized are worth thinking about.
Revising the Language of SS4
Can the argument of 4 be understood as anything but a string of obvious falsehoods? After pondering this question, I can see two ways to salvage it. Either one might try a stipulative definition of “good� here, or one might look for a better translation into English of Kant’s word “Gut�. The German term, like the English word “good� can be used in situations in which one person is monitoring the performance of another (e.g., cutting something along a line that has been marked) and means to express approval. I think what we need is a generalized version of that usage. One might say “right�, in the sense of “that gets it right�, or “correct�, or “satisfactory�, in the sense of “up to our standard�. I believe (but may be wrong) that each of the main points Kant makes in 4 can be defended as reasonable if they are translated using some such term, for example, “satisfactory�.
4.1
“In order to judge that something is satisfactory, one needs to have some idea of what is being judged. The items that can be judged using this term will divide into the satisfactory for some further purpose and the per se satisfactory. In either case, the satisfactoriness has to be being judged in the light of an idea of some object in mind, or some end in mind (Zweck). (What one conceives to be satisfactory for one purpose can be entirely inappropriate for another. The word “appropriate� is another of the words we might consider for “Gut� here.) Finally our idea of something as satisfactory necessarily involves a relation of our mind to a possible volition and therefore (trivially) involves a being satisfied (Wohlgefallen) in the existence of an object or an action.�
If I take Kant to be making these claims in the first paragraph of SS4, I don’t have any large problems with any of them. Furthermore, were one to qualify "good" as "morally good" I don't think it would mean anything much different from "satisfactory from the moral point of view". (There is perhaps some slight difference there.) Richardsmyth
